Foreign occupation, even when accompanied by large amounts of money, does not guarantee a smooth transition to democracy. Since the Dayton accords of December 1995, Bosnia has effectively been under the control of the international community, led by Europe. Aid has flowed freely: In the late 1990s, foreign assistance amounted to a quarter of the country's gross national income. While this international effort has kept the lid on a volatile situation, it has hardly set Bosnia on a clear path toward democratic autonomy. The situation in Kosovo, which in 1999 became a de facto NATO protectorate, is no better.

Second, we must reject the arguments of President Jacques Chirac of France and others who have pushed for a rapid transition to full sovereignty for Iraq. Only Iraqis can create a stable, democratic Iraq, but those Iraqis who share such a vision cannot prevail unless the United States and others make a commitment to remain engaged over the long term.

Finally, we can't expect policy consistency. While it's true that a new Iraq must be fashioned by Iraqis, it is not clear today who these Iraqis will be. Meanwhile, the policies and strategies that we are employing may need frequent revision. Infrastructure development, rule of law, elections, security, and government effectiveness will not progress at the same speed. It may become essential to think in new ways and, for instance, encourage partnerships between Iraqis and non-Iraqis (nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, other countries) that could improve education, health care, fiscal policy, security, and the disposition of oil revenue. Accountability might have to begin with local rather than national elections.